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Seif I. TAG EL-DIN*
1. Introduction
Capital market – or more precisely the primary capital market – is the fulcrum of capital 
formation whereby liquid funds are effectively mobilised, pooled and channelled through the 
financial system to finance the production of goods and services in the economy and, hence, 
effectively contribute to real economic growth. However, the long term commitment of funds in 
the production of goods and services tend to be thwarted by two major concerns on the supply side 
of funds (1) parting with liquidity and (2) exposure to various economic risks. An efficiently liquid 
capital market is, therefore, one which prudently resolves these two major problems through the 
structuring of appropriate capital market instruments and the placement of supportive financial 
and regulatory institutions. The worldwide phenomenal growth of secondary financial markets 
have thus flourished to cater the needed liquidity and risk management services through the free 
sale and purchase of capital and money market instruments. In particular, the trading of short term 
loans or debt instruments through money markets, with maturity less than one year, proves to be an 
important efficiency-enhancing arm to capital markets.
Islamic finance is governed by the law of Shari’ah (Muslims’ law) which basically prohibits 
the interest rate as well as a kind of ‘structured’ uncertainty within financial contracts called 
gharar1). Depending on the maturity of financial assets, it will be shown that Islamic securities 
can be structured to act as either ‘capital market’ or ‘money market’ instruments. It is particularly 
interesting to see how Islamic capital and money market instruments have been structured with a 
view to issues of liquidity and risk management.  Yet, currencies in whatever denomination are not 
legitimate objects of money market trade from Shari’ah perspective. For example, foreign exchange 
has to satisfy the hand-to-hand condition, which means that any deliberate delay or deference in the 
exchange of currency falls in the special category of prohibited usury called riba al-nasaa’ or the 
usury of deference2).  
This paper is about the experience of the newly emerging Islamic capital and money markets, 
and how they have been set out to integrate with global capital markets in accordance with 
Shari’ah-compliant solutions. At the outset, a brief background on the importance of money markets 
is given, followed by a comparative demonstration of conventional and Islamic financial markets. 
The structural properties of Islamic capital and money market instruments are then explained 
with reference to the emerging financial market experience in the Muslim world. In anticipation 
*     Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Leicestershire
1)　Unlike the strict prohibition of  interest rate financing, removal of gharar in Islamic jurisprudence is taken as 
a best effort practice since it might be impossible to guard against all possible sources of uncertainty in a sale 
contract or a financial contract. 
2)　Riba al-nasaa’ is defined in the barter exchange of some specific foods and monetary items (gold and silver) as 
any time deference in the exchange of such items; e.g. exchanging spot units silver against deferred units of gold.  
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of possible ideological concerns about the present upsurge of Islamic capital markets in the global 
world economy, a short historical background about the role capital markets in the early Muslim 
civilisation is provided, followed by conclusive remarks. 
2. Why Money Markets?
Money markets play an important role in helping governments and corporations synchronize 
cash outflows and inflows, and help regulators control the supply of money.  Governments can get 
quick cash from the sale of Treasury Bills to finance immediate obligations in anticipation of tax 
proceeds. Similarly, large corporations can have close access to quick cash from money markets 
to meet their immediate obligations (e.g salary payments, public utility bills, etc.) in anticipation 
of  sales’ proceeds. Central banks, on the other hand, are able to regulate money supply through 
‘open market operations’ within the money market. Acting as agents for distributing government 
securities, central banks sell government securities in large amounts if the desired policy is to 
reduce money supply, or alternatively buy government bonds from the public if the policy is to 
increase money supply.  
In addition to having ‘less than a year maturity’ money market instruments have three 
common characteristics: (1) that they are usually sold in very large denominations hardly accessible 
to households and small businesses; (2) that they usually have low default risk and (3) that they have 
a highly active and liquid secondary market.  Being wholesale markets with large transactions, 
usually in excess of $ 1 million, modern money markets are more suited to brokers and dealers 
within the trading rooms of large banks and brokerage houses or through complex electronic 
networks, than to small scale investors and individuals.  The low risk associated with money markets 
is largely attributable to relatively low investment rates of return compared to capital market rates. 
Buyers of money market securities (borrowers) are not primarily attracted by prospects of high 
returns. Rather, it is the appeal of finding a good substitute to holding idle cash for short periods of 
time which makes money markets’ securities particularly attractive to buyers. When a productive 
use for a cash surplus is still in the process of being worked out, it pays investors to warehouse their 
surplus cash temporarily in money market instruments until the productive use commences.  
Money markets are therefore equally vital for Islamic economies, not in the least for 
controlling and regulating money supply in the economy. The main jurist problem with conventional 
money instruments relates to their pre-dominant debt-based structure. Nonetheless, the recent 
upsurge in short term Islamic bonds (sukuk or certificates), seems to have filled a significant 
gap in the growing Islamic financial markets. Islamic central banks – as in Sudan, Pakistan and 
Malaysia – have also developed legitimate money market instruments on the basis of musharakah 
to help regulating money supply in the economy. While particularly relevant for short term money 
market dealings, sukuk can still perform the function of capital market instruments, depending on 
the maturity of the sakk or the certificate. According to AAOIFI’s (the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions) Shari’ah standards,  investment sukuk include sukuk 
of ownership of leased assets, ownership of services, murabahah, salam, istisnaa, mudarabah, 
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musharakah, investment agency, and sharecropping, irrigation and agricultural partnership.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the special properties or Shari’ah standards of 
different Islamic financing modes – mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, ijarah, salam, istisnaa, 
etc. – as they underlie the complex structure of  sukuk in the emerging Islamic money and capital 
markets.  The appended list of references can help the reader to acquire the needed background.  A 
more formal statement of how sukuk may originate from different Islamic modes is given in Adam 
and Thomas [2004]. Nonetheless, it is important to offer a brief background on mudarabah and 
musharakah in the comparative demonstration of conventional as against Islamic corporate concepts.  
3. Corporate Finance: the Conventional versus the Islamic Version. 
Liquid capital is channelled to productive enterprises through the creation of corporate 
equity or the borrowing of funds whenever new enterprises are being established or existing ones 
being expanded3). In the conventional practice there are different ways of raising equity capital or 
borrowing funds, depending on the different legal structures of companies. Generally, providers 
of equity capital are considered the legal owners of any given enterprise no matter whether equity 
is issued to the general public through modern corporations; or privately placed through limited 
liability companies; or maintained within the legal charter of unlimited partnerships. 
However, emphasis is placed in this paper on the modern public corporation since it is the 
pivotal form of business organisation that sparks the bulk of capital market activity. The modern 
corporate entity is identifiable by three fundamental characteristics: (1) being an independent legal 
personality from its equity owners (i.e. the shareholders), (2) having a provision of limited liability 
of shareholders towards the debts of the company, (3) admitting negotiability of shares in the stock 
exchange.  Obviously, liquidity in the capital market depends crucially on whether corporate equity 
is negotiable or not in terms of the free sale and purchase of corporate equity within organised 
secondary markets. This facility, however, is often restricted to listed public corporations, thus 
partly explaining why public corporations tend to grow at considerably higher rates than other legal 
forms of business organisation. For example, although public corporations represent around 15% of 
businesses in the USA, they make about 85% of all sales [Kolb and Rodriguez 1992: 12].  
Funds can also be borrowed at an interest rate either directly from the banking system; or 
through publicly issued bonds that can also be traded in secondary markets; or through the private 
placement of loans or bonds to lenders subject to agreed terms and conditions.  Yet, lending of 
funds in whatever form does not confer a status of ownership on lenders as it creates a fixed 
liability upon the equity holders. Companies are thus under the legal obligation to pay lender dues 
out of the company’s profit before paying out any dividends to equity holders.  It partly explains 
why borrowed funds in the conventional practice are not grouped with equity in one class to make 
3)　Incidentally, the English term ‘equity’ – which means ‘qist’ in Arabic - has similar shades of meaning in both 
languages. While it means ‘fairness’ in both English and Arabic, it also means ‘stake’ or ‘share’ in both languages, 
thus giving the logical implication that fairness is rooted in the idea of sharing.   Among other things in this paper, 
it is interesting to see how the Islamic principle fairness in capital markets compares with that of conventional 
capital market.
57
Capital and Money Markets of Muslims
up for the accounting definition of capital.  Rather, borrowed funds offer a special service of 
leverage to the existing equity capital whenever borrowing money appears to be more rewarding 
to the owner of the firm than selling new equity. If  the business succeeds, the owner should be 
able to meet the loan repayments as promised,  and reap all future profits without the need to share 
them. In general, if  the entrepreneur is confident about the prospects of his/her business, and has 
the opportunity to borrow money, a loan is a more attractive source of money than getting it from 
an equity investor, who will own a piece of your business and receive a share of the profits.  It is 
interesting to see how the Islamic corporate structure may accommodate an acceptable form of 
leverage given that interest rate borrowing is not allowed. 
The conventional and Islamic corporate concepts agree on the treatment of corporate equity as 
evidence of ownership whereas money lending is not.  Furthermore, money lending is defined from 
the Islamic jurist perspective as means of ownership transference thus giving an additional logical 
reason why the interest rate, in the first place, is an illegitimate source of income4).  The capital 
structures of modern Islamic corporations are typically pure equity-based apart from the widespread 
use of specifically structured Shari’ah compliant bonds, i.e. sukuk, for medium to short-term financing 
and investment objectives.  It is shortly shown that the basic structure of sukuk reflects fixed earning 
features similar to those bonds even though they still fall short of furnishing the needed leverage in 
the capital structure of modern Islamic companies.  This is partly due to the prevalence of sovereign 
sukuk in the Muslim world though there is a looming horizon for corporate sukuk5). 
As regards the Islamic version of corporate equity, it relates to the concept of Sharikah, the 
Arabic word for ‘company’, as it originates in the jurisprudence of mudarabah and musharakah 
contracts.  Mudarabah arises where a provider of capital called the rabb al-mal (or a group of such 
capital providers) enters into a contract with a manager (called the mudarib) to engage in any specific 
trade activity with the objective of sharing the potential profit. At the core of any mudarabah contract 
there are four basic conditions between the mudarib and the capital provider(s) as follows:
・ Profit, when realised, has to be shared between the two parties in accordance with a profit-
sharing ratio pre-stipulated at the time of the contract.  Loss, in case it arses, would have to 
be born entirely by rabb al-mal as the mudarib only loses his or her effort. 
・ The rabb al-mal cannot interfere in the day-to-day management of the mudarabah, apart 
from his or her right to restrict possible fields of economic activity for the mudarabah. This 
provision, however, has to be made clear within the mudarib contract. 
・ The mudarib has a ‘hand of trust’ (yad amana) in the management of mudarabah capital, 
4)　Al-Mawsu’ah al-Fiqhiyyah, Volume 33, Ministry of Awqaf, Kuwait, 1992, p.122. All scholars believe that lending 
is a means of ownership transference, they only differ about the time when ownership is transferred; whether it is 
transferred immediately by the contract of qard like the Malikites, or transferred after delivery like the Hanafites, 
Hanbalites and the shafiites, with some internal differences within the same school.
5)　[Adam and Thomas 2004] , Chapters 4 and 5. 
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which means he would work to his best effort and, therefore, cannot guarantee capital or 
profit to rabb al-mal. 
・ Loss of capital can be guaranteed by the mudarib only when such loss proves to be the 
result of mismanagement or delinquency of the mudarib; or where such loss results from a 
breach of the contract, like violating restricted fields of economic activity. 
Alternatively, if all the parties contribute to capital, the contract becomes one of musharakah 
which gives the parties the right to engage in the management of the company but embodies similar 
features as those of mudarabah, notably the uncertainty of profit. The fact that part of the capital 
is contributed by the client leads to special provisions in the musharakah contract which can be 
summed up in the following: 
・ Partners of musharakah all have the right to engage in the day-to-day management of the 
musharakah capital, except where one party deliberately gives up (wavers) this right to 
other parties. Many Islamic banks prefer to wave rights of musharakah management to 
clients on the grounds that clients are more qualified to run their own businesses. 
・ Profit, when realised, has to be shared by partners in proportion to their capital 
contributions (i.e. on pro-rata basis) unless otherwise agreed on reasonable ground. In the 
context of Islamic banking, it is possible for the client to get a proportionately bigger share 
of profit if the bank has already waved its right in management to the client.  Loss, however, 
has to be strictly shared on pro-rata basis. 
・ No one party can be held liable to guarantee capital or profit to other parties. Only where 
mismanagement and delinquency are proved or where a breach of the musharakah contract 
is committed, the party so charged may be held liable to guarantee capital contributions of 
other parties. 
・ Profit (or loss) cannot be prioritised within the musharakah contract. No party (or group of 
parties) can be preferred to others in terms of profit distribution or loss allocation, and no 
pre-fixed return can be promised to any. The fact that all parties have to be treated on an 
equal footing (paris passu) underscores profit & loss sharing (PLS) as the core concept of 
musharakah. 
As it stands, the received jurist contracts of mudarabah and musharakah do not embody the 
limited liability provision, but the majority of the contemporary Muslim scholars have approved of 
imited liability in the legal charter of the modern Islamic company6). Also, the trading of company 
6)　See [AAOIFI 2004-5: 210], “It is permissible to restrict the liability of a company to its paid up capital if this is 
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shares was not an accepted practice in the received jurisprudence. The sharikah would have to 
be automatically liquidated in the event of a partner’s exit or entry, even though partners may 
agree to form a new sharikah contract afterwards.  Again, the contemporary scholars have rightly 
acknowledged the right of partners to agree on different terms and conditions as regards the trading 
or otherwise of company shares. In the statement of the generally accepted AAOIFI’s Shari’ah 
standards it is stated that:  “It is permitted to buy and sell shares of corporations, on spot or deferred 
basis in which delay is permitted, if the activity of the corporation is permissible irrespective of its 
being an investment (that is the acquisition of the share with the aim of profiting from it) or dealing 
in it (that is, with the intention of benefiting from the difference in prices)” [AAOIFI 2004-5]. 
The above standard rests upon the common consensus about ‘equity’ across all the different 
corporate forms that it represents a partner’s ‘right of ownership’ in the company.  Hence, to the 
extent that the company largely consists of real assets and that the legal charter of the company 
permits the entry and exit of partners, there can be no Shari’ah objection for the trading of such 
company shares. In this sense, the modern Islamic company combines important features of 
musharakah and mudarabah in addition to the limited liability provision of the modern corporation. 
On one hand, the musharakah element relates to the existence of shareholders who collectively 
contribute the company’s capital and share profit/loss on pro rata basis. On the other hand, the 
mudarabah element relates to the contractual relationship between shareholders, on one hand, 
as rabb al-mal, and the management, on the other hand, as mudarib so long as the company’s 
management share in the company’s profits.  Yet, if the company’s management are paid fixed 
salaries, it will still be an acceptable form of human ijara rather mudarabah.  
To sum up, there are two factors which distinguish an Islamic company from a conventional 
one: (A) the financing of capital or business operations of the company, and (B) the legitimacy of 
its economic activity.  In a nutshell, the Islamic corporate concept is one which satisfies two basic 
conditions: (1) that shareholders capital is raised through the Profit & Loss Sharing principle as 
defined above, and (2) that the economic activity is a halal one.  In other words, any company will 
deviate from the above definition of the Islamic corporate concept whenever capital or business 
operations are partly financed through borrowing at the interest rate, or whenever economic 
activities include the utilisation or production of illegitimate goods or services (e.g. wine, pig meat, 
pornographic material, etc.). 
4. Shariah Issues in Capital Market Instruments. 
The essence of modern financial markets is to successfully channel small savings towards 
productive uses either directly through the issuance of corporate securities (equities and bonds) or 
indirectly through the financing of banks and other financial intermediaries.  This paper, however, 
is focused on directly issued capital market instruments, hence shedding light on conceptual bases 
of security and negotiability as key words from the Islamic perspective.  To perceive these key 




useful. Just as physical productive assets (e.g plants, equipments, and real estate properties) are 
permissible objects of exchange in the real asset markets , financial assets - or securities - are 
analogous objects of exchange in financial markets. To one thing common between the two kinds of 
assets is that both are investment assets in the sense of generating future cash flows for the holder, 
and both are bought and both are sold at a price.  Yet while the buying and selling of physical assets 
is freely allowed under Shari’ah, there are important constraints governing the buying and selling 
of financial assets.  This emerges from the fact that unlike physical assets that are directly visible 
to potential buyers, a security is an information-loaded document that is purely reducible to a set of 
terms and conditions between parties.  
Shari’ah issues, therefore, crop up from the recognition of a security as a vehicle of 
contractual information between two parties, the seller of security who demands funding and the 
buyer who offers the required funding.  The conventional bond is an obvious case of a non-Shari’ah 
compliant security as it guarantees both principal and interest to the lender.  Nonetheless, Shari’ah 
issues encompass a wider range of questions, not only with a view to the prohibited interest but 
also with regard to the prohibited gharar as defined above.  It is the main responsibility of Shari’ah 
Boards to carefully and conscientiously scrutinize the underlying contracts of financial securities 
even if they seem to represent legitimate transactions. Corporate equity is the best example of a 
permissible security involving two parties -  investor (provider of capital) and investee (manager 
of investment) -  yet gharar might still creep into the equity contract if it contains any structured 
uncertainties (e.g. an ambiguous statement about the profit-sharing ratio).  
Gharar in the context of financial securities stands for incomplete contractual information 
as it may arise from two possible sources (1) the underlying contract of a financial security or (2) 
the external marketing information. The first source makes up for uncertainties within the basic 
structure of the contract, thus evoking outright Shari’ah-rejection. This may arise from contractual 
ambiguity or uncertainty within an otherwise legitimate security; e.g. failure to make precise 
statements of price or quantity in an underlying sale contract of a security, or statement of profit-
sharing ratio in an underlying mudarabah contract.  It may also arise from built-in uncertainties in 
the terms and conditions of a financial security that do not conform to Shari’ah. This is particularly 
the case of futures, options, and swaps, or more generally financial derivatives that are extensively 
utilized in the conventional financial markets.  
The second source of gharar does not evoke outright Shari’ah rejection but directly relates to 
the issue of information efficiency. External market information (e.g. movements in stock prices, 
interest rates, tax policy, corporate profit rate, risk rates, etc.) is often the initial trigger for investors 
to decide which security to buy and for investees to decide which security to issue. Information flow 
is indeed the blood circulation of a financial market that makes up for its overall economic health. 
In the early works of Islamic economists attention was brought to the possible rise of prohibited 
gharar in the trading of company shares when the necessary information is not adequately 
disclosed to the parties7).  An efficient financial market is one where the relevant economic 
7)　See for example, [Tag el-Din 1996].
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information is made easily accessible to all potential participants. In particular, information about 
cost and income is vital for the flow of funds since investors will always look for better investment 
returns while investees look for lower financial costs. Security prices are the needed indicators of 
cost for investees and return for investors and, therefore, they must therefore be decided within 
an information-efficient market.  An Islamic financial market has to be information efficient, not 
only in terms of the relevant financial indicators but also in terms of prudent advice against gharar 
and ghaban-prone malpractices. It is little surprise that failures and occasional crises in financial 
markets are often attributable to failures in the circular flow of economic information.  
4.1.  Investment in Global Equity Markets.
Corporate equity – in the sense of ordinary shares – tends to be the most dominant vehicle of 
investment in Islamic investment funds, given the Shari’ah approval of trading in equity investments. 
It has further been permitted, subject to a carefully detailed set of criteria, to trade in the shares of 
corporations whose primary activities are lawful but they make deposits or borrow on the basis of 
interest, thus opening the door for Islamic investments in global equity markets and the construction of 
global Islamic Indices (e.g. Islamic Dow Jones, Islamic FTSE, etc.) under strict Shari’ah supervision. 
It is not our intention to offer a comprehensive statement of the relevant Shari’ah criteria for trading in 
global equity funds, though it is worth while highlighting two important rules as follows:
・　That the total amount of debt raised in the corporation through borrowing at the 
interest-rate, both  long term or short term,  should not exceed 30%  of the market 
capitalisation of the corporation (that is the market value of outstanding shares in the 
secondary market at a given point of time).  
・　That the total amount of income generated from prohibited activity or prohibited 
asset does not exceed 5% of the total income of the corporation. This condition 
invokes special efforts on part of Shari’ah to explore sources of income that are not 
sufficiently disclosed in the corporate statements. 
It should be born in mind, however, that returns realised from global equity funds which abide 
by the above given percentages are not totally halal since they embody an illegitimate component 
no matter how small it could be. Thus, it is held obligatory on the investor (or the fund manager 
on the investor’s behalf) to eliminate the prohibited component specific to the share. In the actual 
practice, managers of global Islamic equity funds advice Muslim clients of the amount of prohibited 
income that needs to be purified out of the distributed returns. It is a usual practice to dispose of 
such component in charitable activities.  
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4.2. Structural Properties of Sukuk and Certificates.  
The literature on Islamic sukuk and Islamic investment certificates has grown rapidly since 
the early 1990’s in a sincere effort by Islamic economists, bankers and Shari’ah scholars to reap the 
fruits of a liquid Islamic financial market through a sufficiently wide range of Islamic instruments. 
The challenge was not only to structure an Islamic bond/ certificate, but to also make it ‘negotiable’ 
in the sense of being freely bought and sought in the secondary market.  Take, for example, the case 
of a legitimate murabahah contract as the subject matter of an Islamic bond. The jurist problem 
would soon arise that the murabahah bond cannot be freely bought and sold without violating the 
Shari’ah ruling about the sale of debt; basically, because the murabahah bond underlies a receivable 
debt from the sale of a commodity. Selling a debt instrument in practice is the same thing as 
discounting the amount of debt, implying that the seller receives from buyer a smaller amount than 
the actual debt. In other words, the murabahah bond, if traded, will boil down to a conventional 
‘discount bond’ that is issued below par value.  
The problem will not have arisen if the murabahah bond represents a share, not only in 
receivable debt, but also in the inventory of goods being traded, such that receivable debt represents 
a small percentage (usually less than 50%) of the total asset base of the bond. More radically, 
the problem will not have arisen if the Islamic bond is based on an ijarah contract whereby the 
bond represents, not just a share in the rental payments, but basically a share of ownership in 
the underlying asset or equipment being rented. This is the essence of an assed-based security 
in Islamic investment banking which should not be confused with the conventional concept of 
asset-backed bond.  The latter is often used in the sense of the cash flow being collateralised by a 
physical asset, rather than a right of the bond holder in the ownership of the underlying asset. 
The basic structural property of a legitimately negotiable sakk is the assurance that the 
bond represents a share of ownership in an underlying fixed asset not less than 30% of the total 
asset base that generates the cash f low.  This makes it comparable to a corporate equity, and 
therefore permits the buying and selling of such Islamic bonds side by side with Islamic company 
shares in secondary markets.  This is the basis rule upon which Islamic investment bankers have 
recently utilised the various properties of Islamic financing modes (ijarah, istisnaa, musharakah, 
mudarabah, etc.) to structure a wide variety of negotiable sukuk with carefully detailed Shari’ah 
standards.  In the AAOIFI Shari’ah standards, investment sukuk are characterised as “certificates 
of equal value issued in the name of the owner or bearer in order to establish the certificate owner 
over the financial rights and obligations represented by the certificates”. ( [AAOIFI 2004-5: 300], 
4/1 - under Characteristics of Investment Sukuk). 
To better appreciate the structure of a negotiable Islamic bond (sakk), there are five structural 
features of conventional bonds that need to be assessed from Shari’ah perspective. 
○　Par value or face value:  This is the actual amount of money promised by 
the bond issuer to the bond holder at maturity.  
○　Maturity date: This is the time when the face value of a bond will be paid 
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off to holder.  
○　Coupon payment: It is the amount of money paid to the bond holder at 
specified periods (e.g monthly, quarterly) before and/or at maturity. 
○　Coupon rate/ or coupon interest rate:  is defined as coupon payment 
divided by par value.
○　Zero coupon bonds (zeros):  these are discount bonds, carrying no coupon 
payments apart from payment of par value at the time of maturity.
In brief, a conventional bond is always issued with a face value that is promised to the holder 
at the time of maturity regardless of whether or not coupon payments are paid during the bond’s 
holding time. The main Shari’ah objection against conventional bonds is the guaranteed payment 
of face value at the time of maturity plus interest return.  The Shari’ah objection is obvious with 
coupon bonds where interest rate payments are promised in addition to the face value at maturity. 
But this is also true of zero-coupon bonds as they are issued at discount rates, which means in the 
sense of bond holders paying less money today for more money tomorrow. This is the prohibited 
interest rate lending.  
Nonetheless, an Islamic sakk can be so structured as to yield predictable cash flows, as in 
the case of Ijarah-based bonds, but no legitimate Islamic bond can guarantee payment of pre-
determined amounts at the time of maturity in addition to other stream of payments.  The only 
situation where an Islamic bond can guarantee payment of par value to holder is the qard hasan 
bond which ought to be issued at par as well as retired at par value. Fairly broad coverage of 
potential sukuk with appropriately stipulated Shari’ah standards is formally stated in Adam and 
Thomas [2004]. 
5. Asset-backed Securitised Sukuk
Securitisation is a popular method of structured finance that is gaining increasing grounds 
in Islamic finance. Conventionally, it is a means of securitising debt, but securitisation is not 
limited to debt. As a matter of fact it is mostly the securitisation of real capital assets and property 
leasehold interests that give room to the Islamic and alternative. It all depends on the nature of the 
cash flow generated by the pool of receivable assets that needs to be securitised. If it is simply debt-
servicing in terms of interest and principal repayments, this is obviously non-tenable to Shari’ah. 
Otherwise, if the cash flow represents lease payments generated from a pool of rented property or 
equipment, it then becomes tenable to Shari’ah-compliant securitisation. 
In taking the decision to securitize an outstanding pool of receivable loans or other assets, 
the issuer is often motivated by various possible motives. This can be the desire to raise finance 
at the least possible cost of funds, or simply to remove a specific pool of assets from the firm’s 
balance sheet with a view to improving returns on debt or equity, or to free up working capital for 
further core business, or to restructure the balance sheet and reduce capital leverage in the way 
of conforming to regulatory capital adequacy requirements. The securitisation process consists 
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of transferring the given pool of assets from the original firm to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
which will then break it down into investment units and sell them out to investors.  In the current 
practice there are three possible financial structures of securitisation. 
・ Path-through securitisation: This is associated with the sale of the pool of assets by the 
original issuer to the SPV, thus ridding the balance sheet of the originator from the given 
pool of assets. The SPV will then utilise the acquired pool of assets to issue investment 
bonds (or Islamic sukuk).  Investors will have total interest in the cash flow generated by 
the securities assets such that all cash receivables are passed directly by the SPV to the 
investors (less servicing charges and third party expenses). The immediate appeal of this 
arrangement lies in making it possible for the original issuer to raise lump sum money 
while being isolated from any future repayment claims in relation to this transaction. 
That is, investors’ recourse is only to the trustee who assumes a fiduciary responsibility 
to protect the interest of investors against a fee payable by the issuer or from the pool of 
assets.  From the investors’ perspective, the quality of cash flow generated by the given 
asset-backed securities is easier to analyse since it emanates from a small well-defined pool 
of assets rather than a complex business structure. The issuer SPV is usually described as 
‘bankruptcy-remote’ as the liquidation of  the originator will not impact the assets and their 
income stream through the SPV. 
・ Asset-backed bond securitisation:  In this case the pool of assets is not sold to the SPV 
and the investors will only have a fractional interest in the cash flow generated by the 
pool of assets. The latter will therefore remain in the originator’s balance sheet but used 
as collateral for a further debt obligation by the issuer. All that is being done in this case 
is the ability of the originator to utilise its pool of debt assets in generating further funds 
without having to sell the debt assets. The best example is a mortgage company with 
debt assets which generate a steady stream of income.  Asset-backed bond securitisation 
makes it possible for the mortgage to raise further capital in order to make further loans 
without having to wait long until the existing receivable debt has been recouped. Hence, by 
bundling up a large number of individual residential mortgages, it will be possible to partly 
issue high quality asset-backed bonds  to potential investors through an SPV while still 
keeping the assets within the balance sheet of the originator.  
・ Pay-through securitisation: As against the pass-through structure where the SPV only 
stands ready to re-direct collected cash f lows of the original pool through securitised 
bonds to the investors, this securitisation structure places an additional obligation on the 
SPV to guarantee a stream of income to bond holders irrespective of collections dates of 
the original pool of assets.  In order to avoid possible fluctuations in collection dates and 
hence smooth out payments to bond holders, the SPV falls back on guaranteed investment 
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contracts or credit enhancements through third parties.  Here again the pool of assets 
remains within the balance sheet of the originator, but the SPV reconfigures the cash flow 
to suit payment obligations to various classes of investors, hence combining features of 
path-throughs and asset-backed bonds. 
As it appears, the path-through securitisation structure is the one that is more readily 
compatible to Shari’ah provided that the original pool of assets to be securitised is not of a pure debt 
nature.  Yet, in the current experience of Islamic securitisation it has been possible to adopt various 
versions of securitisations subject to specific Shari’ah provisions. For example, it was possible to 
work out an Islamic securitisation on the basis of fractional interest in underlying equipment leases 
owned by three off-shore USA companies [El-Helw 2000].   More detailed analysis of Islamic sukuk 
can be referred to the edited work of Nathif J. Adam and Abdelkadir Thomas8). 
6.  The Islamic Investment Fund
In the terminology of AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic 
Financial Institutions), Islamic investment services are divided into two broad categories: 
unrestricted investment accounts and restricted investment accounts.  The first category consists 
of the Profit and Loss Sharing (“PLS accounts”) accounts, being the balance-sheet alternative for 
conventional interest-based term deposit where Islamic banks are authorized to mix their own 
resources with the clients’ investment deposits.  The second (restricted investment accounts) 
are also governed by the Islamic Profit and Loss Sharing principle, but it is managed by banks 
as off-balance sheet investments on behalf of clients, and in accordance to different investment 
preferences of the clients.  It is, indeed, the second category which makes up for widely ranging 
investment services offered by Islamic banks to satisfy ever-changing needs of clients.  This 
booklet is particularly focused on the structural features of ‘Islamic investment funds’ which is the 
dominant investment vehicle marketed under different terms and conditions by Islamic banks. 
The working principle of an investment fund is to invite subscriptions from multiple investors, 
combine them into relatively large funds and appropriately manage them against a fee or a pre-agreed 
ratio of the return through investment banking departments. Each subscribing investor will hold a 
number of units in the given fund, priced at a specific value on the subscription day. Working in the 
best interest of the investors, the fund manager’s objective is to generate economic growth that reflects 
an ever rising unit value of the investment fund.  Apart from growth prospects, open-end investment 
funds offer valuable liquidity services to investors through well-timed schedules of entry and exit 
– or ‘subscription’ and ‘redemption’ as they are often known. Risk management is a particularly 
valuable service offered to investors through professionally managed investment funds.  Investors 
are, therefore, attracted by the prospect of access to a wide range of investments made possible by 
economies of scale which, otherwise, are unattainable through individual investment efforts.  
Islamic investment funds are structured along similar lines of open-ended unit investment 
8)　[Adam and Thomas 2004], Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
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trusts as usually seen in the UK, or mutual funds as usually seen in the USA. Where the underlying 
value of the assets is always directly represented by the total number of units issued multiplied by 
the unit price, less the transaction or management fee charged and any other associated costs. The 
fund manager, also known as the portfolio manager, utilises the collected investment subscritions 
for the purpose of generating investor returns from the underlying investments.  The value of 
a share of the fund, known as the net asset value per share / unit (NAV), is calculated through 
the division of the total value of the fund by the number of shares / units currently issued and 
outstanding. The investment proceeds are then passed along to the individual investors in terms of 
appreciated unit values, or depeciated unit values in the case of loss.
6.1  The Structural Properties : 
Shari’ah issues are particularly related to three structural properties commonly shared by 
investment funds as follows:
1. The Management contract. This relates to the contractual relationship 
between manager of the fund, on one hand, and the community of investors 
making up the fund on the other hand.  
2. Funds’ utilization. This relates to the operational process of utilizing the 
funds and generating investment returns. 
3. Distribution of returns: This relates to how investment returns are 
distributed to the subscribing investors. 
6.2 The Management Contract. 
There are two possible options for the manager / investor relationship in Islamic investment 
funds: (1) an agency contract, as it is most commonly adopted (2) or, more occasionally, the Profit 
and Loss Sharing principle. 
The latter is where the Islamic bank performs management under, for example, the capacity 
of mudarib, with or without mixing of bank’s funds, visa-vis the community of investors as the 
rabb al-mal parties.  And since the mudarib will get nothing in the case of loss, the major attraction 
of mudarabah management lies in the strong profit incentive for more efficient management. 
On the other hand, the agency contract has the special appeal of generating fee income to 
the manager as a pre-assigned percentage of the fund’s NAV (Net Asset Value, as defined above). 
Unlike the case of mudarabah, where manager’s income is tied up with net profit, the agency fee is 
relatively more secure since it is tied up with the fund’s NAV.  
Taking the manager as agent and investors as principal, it should be noted that the agent 
can only work on best-effort basis, hence cannot guarantee the desired results to the principal. 
Nonetheless, the agency contract has its own incentive-compatible property since the NAV 
fluctuates up and down with the market unit value of the fund, thus putting appropriate pressure 
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on management to perform most efficiently. Furthermore,  the agent may be given a “Performance 
Incentive” being an amount equal to profits generated above a certain rate of return on the wakala 
capital invested for a relevant wakala period.
6.3  Utilization of Funds.
The second structural feature of Islamic investment funds relates to how the pooled funds are 
utilized in the pursuit of investment returns.  At the outset it is obviously clear that Islamic funds 
should operate in accordance with Shari’ah rules; hence excluding illegitimate economic activities 
(e.g. production of haram goods and services) and illegitimate financial transactions (mainly, 
interest rate transactions and gharar dealings).   
However, investment funds operate primarily in secondary financial markets where financial 
securities are bought and sold rather than primary financial markets where productive economic 
projects are yet to be financed. Secondary financial markets include ‘capital markets’ and ‘money 
markets’ where governmental and corporate securities are traded, together with ‘securitized’ 
financial assets (issued through special purpose vehicles), and financial market derivatives (e.g 
futures, options and swaps).  The study of secondary financial markets has therefore become an 
integral part of investment funds. It is true that ‘securitized’ assets and financial derivatives are 
vital for the operation of investment funds but this is beyond the scope of the present booklet. It 
suffices within the limited scope of this introductory booklet to shed light on capital market and 
money market securities. 
6.4  Distribution of Returns:
The third and final structural feature of Islamic investment funds relates to the distribution 
of investment returns to the investor community who subscribed to the fund.  Whether or not the 
management contract is one of mudarabah or agency, the manager’s role is to pass the investment 
proceeds along to the individual investors in terms of appreciated unit values – or depeciated 
unit values in the case of loss.  In other words, the manager of an Islamic investment fund cannot 
guarantee any returns to the investors.  This is an important difference from conventional 
investment funds where in certain agent agreements investment returns are guaranteed. 
Another important difference relates to the equal treatment (pari passu) of investors in 
Islamic funds, as opposed to the possibility of prioritizing the payment of investment returns 
in accordance to an agreed preferential order of investment classes. It is a common practice in 
conventional funds to issue three or more securities on the basis of the fund with different levels 
of default risk, such as security A is the first to be paid off from the investment proceeds, followed 
by security B and then the residual goes to security C, if any.  This procedure clearly violates the 
Shari’ah principle of fair treatment to investment partners where the same level of investment risk 
has to be faced by all the partners and all the net profit has to be distributed on pro rata basis, at the 
same time to the investors.  
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7. Islamic Banking and Capital Market Legacy 
As noted above, a brief historical background from the early Muslim civilisation will help 
underscore the Islamic legacy of banking and capital markets, and hence drive home the current 
economic and cultural interaction of Muslim economies with the West as a healthy heritage from 
the distant past.  It is noteworthy that centuries ago the major Italian cities which constituted the 
birthplaces of modern Western capitalism (i.e. Venice, Genoa, Amalfi and others) borrowed many 
of Muslims’ financial instruments and corporate tools, including the accounting principles of 
book-keeping and Arabic numbers which gradually replaced Roman numerals.  Western economic 
historians have unequivocally acknowledged the leading role of Muslims’ booming merchandise 
across the Mediterranean with the Italian Cities in lifting Western Europe from its Dark Ages and 
bringing about the twelfth century economic renaissance to Europe.  In Britannica this is clearly 
stated as: “Ironically, the great age of Islam coincided with the low point of culture in Western 
Europe … Arabic rulers of Baghdad in the ninth Century had the bulk of the corpus Greek Science 
translated, and soon after, their own scholars advanced further, particularly in mathematics, 
astronomy, optics, chemistry and medicine… The twelfth century saw a heroic programme of 
translation of works from Arabic to Latin9)”.  
The positive attitude in medieval Islam towards the profit motive was indeed the basic drive of 
commerce and trade. At the time when the Muslim state encouraged trade and supported the profit 
motive subject to injunctions of Shari’ah, the teachings of the Christian Church in Western Europe 
cherished a poverty-oriented culture, hence, frustrated entrepreneurial motives and accentuated the 
impact of the Dark Ages in socio-economic life. In their analysis of Muslims trade with medieval 
Europe, economic historians acknowledged the groundbreaking role of mudarabah-financed trade 
in acquainting Western Europe with a powerful instrument of corporate finance, hence opening up 
immense opportunities of  profitable trade across the Mediterranean.  mudarabah came to be known 
in the Italian cities as commendo, marking thereafter an important historical phase of corporate 
growth in Western Europe which culminated through time into the modern corporate structure.
The role of a usury-free capital market in early Muslim states was fuelled by rising 
demand for liquid capital and credit to both governments and private entrepreneurs. The simplest 
manifestation of financial services within the early Muslim states took the form of money-
changers (sayarifah) who were also partially engaged in the holding of deposits and the short-term 
financing of trade.  Yet a more sophisticated form of banking finance for trade and government 
was represented by the Jahabidhah who practiced much of the modern financing activities under 
the supervision of the Muslim state. In the highly developed market economy of the Abbasid State, 
Jahabidhah bankers proliferated throughout the state, even though they were mostly of Jews 
who enjoyed the status of Ahl al-Kitab origin (People of the Book) within the early Muslim state. 
The Jahabidhah were basically trade vendors who concurrently practiced business of financing 
and commercial transactions to others. Banking operations were therefore ancillary to primary 
mercantile operations, yet they seemed to have grown to sizeable banking functions particularly 
9)　The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., 1975, Vol. 16, p. 368.
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when the Jahabidhah accepted deposits in efforts to augment their own businesses.
The high streets of Basra were so much replete with money-changers and Jahabidhah that the 
banking network in Basra was rightly called by a Western historian ‘the Wall-Street of the Middle 
Ages’ [Heck 2006: 113]. The famous Persian historian, Nasir-i Khusraw, was reported to have 
estimated the number of Jahabidhah bankers in the state of Isfahan alone at 200 banks [Heck 2006: 
113]. It was such a complex network of banking activities that the call for appropriate government 
supervision and regulation was acknowledged by the Islamic state. To this effect, the Abbasid 
State established a central banking agency in year 316 H/ 929 A.D called Diwan al-Jahabidhah 
to foresee the performance and growth of banks within the empire. A similar central bank was 
established in Egypt by the Fatimid State by the name Dar al-Mal in the commercial capital of al-
Fustat to supervise an equally intense Jahabidhah banking activity in Fatimid Egypt. Among the 
most commonly practiced banking instruments were the sakk (the Arabic root of ‘cheque’) and the 
suftajah (which combined features of traveller cheques and letters of credit), the hawalah (which 
is a means credit transfer), wadi’ah (i.e. deposit), ruq’ah (which was a sort of promissory note). 
The use of cheque (sakk) was particularly known since the time of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. 
A renowned historian, Ibn Abdel-Hakam, reported that Umar ibn al-Khattab paid for the grains 
delivered to the state warehouses by cheque and that he used to pay government wages by cheques 
signed by his treasurer Zaid ibn Thabit. 
Unfortunately, however, usury came to be approved by the Christian Church around the 
fifteenth century and the whole process of economic incorporation followed a non-Islamic usury-
oriented culture. The contemporary movement of Islamic banking should therefore be viewed as a 
revival of earlier efforts of usury-free banking which flourished during the bright years of Muslims 
civilisation.  The Crusades are viewed as a significant landmark in the gradual recovery of Europe 
from its Dark Ages.  In the final analysis, it was the encounter with the thriving civilisation of 
Muslims in commerce and trade which fuelled up the process of economic recovery from the 
dominant barter system even before the Crusades.  The monetisation process in Medieval Europe 
was believed to have taken off from the widespread adoption of the Fatimid Dinar either in original 
form or counterfeited forms which still preserved Arabic scripts to convey a sense of monetary 
genuineness. The Arabs’ minted money helped lifting Europe out of its barter system during the 
middle Ages. Mudarabah also broke new grounds in Italian cities as the most effective corporate 
tool in commercial financing.
8. Conclusions
This paper provides an overview of Islamic capital and money markets and how they compare 
to their conventional counterparts. It explained the nature of Shari’ah issues that normally arise in 
the development of legitimate Islamic products, as they basically relate to the elimination of riba 
(the interest rate) and gharar.  Capital market and money market tools  have been analysed, leading 
to the Islamic concept of sukuk as it is currently taken to replace the conventional bond in Islamic 
financial markets. In this context, asset-backed securitisation and investment fund structuring have 
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been introduced. And finally, the ideological issue of how the current upsurge of Islamic capital 
markets conforms to Islamic legacy has been addressed by reference to the pioneering impact of 
Muslims’ early civilisation on Medieval Europe. 
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